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Which is darker: the green of grass or the green of a pine tree? Does a squir-rel have a short or a long 
tail? Is a walnut larger than a hazelnut? 
Do Labradors have rounded ears? To 
answer questions such as these, you 
probably summoned up images of the 
mentioned items to inspect them in 
your “mind’s eye.” When you enjoy 
a novel, you likely come away with 
a visual impression of the characters 
and scenes described—which can 
lead to that familiar disappointment 
if the book is turned into a movie: “He 
looked nothing like I’d imagined him!” 
Most of us can conjure images to 
order: Visualize the Sun rising above 
the horizon into a misty sky—or your 
kitchen table as you left it this morn-
ing. But it turns out that 1 to 3 per-
cent of the population entirely lack the 
ability to visualize—a condition called 
aphantasia—whereas others have hyper­
phantasia and experience imagery as 
vivid as actual sight. These imagery 
vividness extremes are prime examples 
of invisible differences that are easily 
overlooked but are salient features of 
the inner lives of those concerned. Un-
derstanding how such differences arise 
can help us learn about the many ways 
the mind can implement imagination 
and mental representation. 
The Science of Imagery
Imagery involves the sensory experi-
ence of items in their absence: When 
we visualize a pine tree or the rising 
Sun, most of us have an experience that 
is a bit like seeing. But we can form im-
agery in other sense modalities too: We 
“hear” the sound of distant thunder, 
“feel” the touch of velvet, or imagine 
running for a bus by engaging audi-
tory, tactile, and motor imagery, respec-
tively. Olfactory imagery is more elu-
sive, but many of us can relish the scent 
of a rose or shrink from the smell of 
sewage. To some degree, we can evoke 
absent emotions, imagining a breath 
of sadness or a sudden jolt of surprise. 
Although this article focuses on visual 
imagery, the broad principles seem to 
apply to imagery of all types. 
Experiences of imagery are ubiqui-
tous. They contribute to our recollection 
of the past (think of your last holiday) 
and our anticipation of the future (how 
will you spend next weekend?). They 
figure in our daydreams and our night 
dreams. They have been implicated in 
creative work in both the sciences and 
the arts. Albert Einstein wrote: “I very 
rarely think in words at all,” relying 
instead on “more or less clear images 
which can be voluntarily ‘reproduced’ 
and combined. . . .” The novelist Joseph 
Conrad emphasized the importance of 
imagery to his craft: “My task . . . is, by 
the power of the written word to make 
you hear, to make you feel—it is, before 
all, to make you see.” 
Research over the past century has 
taught us much about the psychology 
of imagery generally and its basis in the 
brain. An impressive series of experi-
ments by Stanford University psycholo-
gist Roger Shepard, Harvard University 
neuroscientist Stephen Kosslyn, and 
others showed that imagery is indeed, 
as intuition might suggest, an echo of 
perception. If we are asked to shift our 
mental gaze between two objects on 
a map that we have memorized, we 
answer more swiftly if they lie close to-
gether rather than far apart, as if we 
were scanning the map with our eyes 
before we respond; in deciding whether 
one object is a rotated version of the oth-
er, the timing of the decision depends 
on the extent of the rotation. A beau-
tifully simple observation epitomizes 
work along these lines: If visualizing is 
really like seeing, visualizing something 
bright should cause a constriction of the 
pupil, as would occur when looking 
at something bright. Bruno Laeng at 
the University of Oslo has shown that, 
indeed, if we switch our mental image 
from a bright sky to a night sky or a 
cloudy one, the pupil duly dilates (see 
figure at the top of page 112).
But there is more to imagery than it 
being simply “weak perception.” Let’s 
say that I ask you to imagine a tulip, 
and you succeed—what color was it, by 
the way?—you engage a whole team of 
more basic cognitive abilities: You must 
be awake and attentive, you require 
your command of the English language 
to decode the instruction, you need 
your memory to retrieve your knowl-
edge of tulips and their appearance, 
you need to use your executive function 
to orchestrate the whole process, and 
you use your perceptual system to gen-
erate the sense of “looking at” a tulip. 
This description reminds us that, like 
any cognitive act, forming an image is 
a process rather than an instantaneous 
event. A measurable amount of time 
passes between receiving the instruc-
tion to “visualize a tulip” and becom-
ing able to inspect and manipulate its 
image in the mind’s eye. On the basis 
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People with aphantasia cannot visualize imagery, a trait that highlights the 
complexities of imagination and mental representation. 
Adam Zeman
QUICK TAKE
A condition called aphantasia affects 1 to 
3 percent of the population. Aphantasics lack 
the ability to visualize imagery—a term that 
includes all the senses, not just sight.
A survey about imagery vividness from 
1880 was the first to document the condition, 
but it remained a little-studied phenomenon 
until the past few decades.
Aphantasia does not imply a lack of imagi-
nation, which indicates that the brain has a 
wide range of methods for cognitive represen-
tation, some more abstract than experiential.
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of a series of behavioral experiments 
like those described above that he and 
his team undertook in the 1980s, Koss-
lyn described four key processing steps 
in our engagement with images. First, 
images must be generated: This step in-
volves mobilizing information about 
how things look and using it to create 
a representation of the visualized item 
in what he called the “visual buffer,” 
a broad description for relevant, visu-
ally oriented regions of the brain. These 
images tend to fade rapidly, probably 
because the visual brain is designed 
to deal with rapidly changing scenes. 
Keeping an image in mind requires 
maintenance, Kosslyn’s second process-
ing step. If we want to use an image to 
answer a specific question—does your 
tulip have a long stem?—we need to 
inspect it, which is the third step; if we 
want to manipulate the image, such as 
twirling our tulip, some transformation 
is called for, the final step.
It is now almost half a century since 
one other fascinating line of evidence 
began to illuminate the science of im-
agery. Functional brain imaging relies 
on the simple principle that the brain 
is like muscle: When it becomes active 
in a task, the blood flow to activated 
regions ramps up. We can observe this 
change in several ways, most com-
monly using magnetic resonance imag-
ing that is sensitive to local changes in 
oxygen concentrations. Two years ago 
my colleague Crawford Winlove identi-
fied 40 studies that had examined brain 
activation during imagery tasks. The 
regions he and others have identified 
(see figure at the bottom of page 112) are 
in keeping with the cognitive processes 
required to call a tulip to the mind’s 
eye—areas in the frontal and parietal 
lobes linked to cognitive control, atten-
tion, and eye movements; areas linked 
to language processing; areas involved 
with memory; and visual cortices in 
the occipital and temporal lobes. The 
leading edge of such research is now 
focused on “mind reading,” which is 
the effort to decode the contents of the 
mind’s eye using brain-imaging data. 
Studies examining the time course of 
acts of visualization in the brain high-
light another, intuitively obvious, dif-
ference between imagery and percep-
tion. When we see, information streams 
in from the eyes to the brain, driving 
activity that spreads through the visual 
system and deep into the brain, allow-
ing us, among other things, to recog-
nize what we see. Visualization is “vi-
sion in reverse”: The brain begins with 
a decision or  instruction—”imagine a 
tulip”—and uses its stored knowledge 
of appearances to drive activity within 
the visual system that leads to the ex-
perience of imagery. 
Imagery, in brief, allows us to simu-
late sensory experience “offline,” en-
abling at least a partial reenactment of 
our past encounters with the world. 
The usual explanation for why we have 
imagery is that it ultimately enhances 
our ability to predict the future and act 
effectively within it. This purpose may 
be true, but recent findings somewhat 
complicate this story. 
Rediscovering Aphantasia
Sir Francis Galton was a Victorian sci-
entist with a passion for measurement, 
which was misapplied in his role in 
the development of eugenics. But his 
“breakfast table questionnaire,” pub-
lished in 1880, was probably the first 
Wonderland by Adelaide Claxton (1841–1927) depicts the mental imagery (here, a smoky imag-
inary figure) that our brains regularly conjure up while reading or while doing any other task 
where we are asked to visualize. People with aphantasia cannot create these mental images.
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systematic attempt to measure the 
vividness of imagery. The question-
naire invited participants to “think 
of some definite object—suppose it is 
your breakfast table as you sat down 
to it this morning—and consider care-
fully the picture that rises before your 
mind’s eye.” They were asked to com-
ment on its degree of illumination, 
definition, and coloring. Galton initially 
circulated his questionnaire to 100 col-
leagues, mostly scientists, classifying 
their responses into those where “the 
faculty is very high,” mediocre, or “at 
the lowest.” To his astonishment, many 
of these “men of science” protested that 
“mental imagery was unknown to them 
. . . they had no more notion of its true 
nature than a colour-blind man, who 
has not discerned his deficit, has of the 
true nature of colour.” When he began 
to sample persons “in general society,” 
however, he found “an entirely different 
disposition to prevail. Many men, and a 
yet larger number of women, and many 
boys and girls, declared that they ha-
bitually saw mental imagery, and that it 
was perfectly distinct to them and full of 
colour.” There were also some notable 
exceptions to the rule among his scien-
tific friends. A certain Charles Darwin, 
Galton’s much esteemed cousin, re-
sponded that his image of the breakfast 
table included some objects “as distinct 
as if I had photos before me.” 
Galton’s questionnaire spawned 
many descendants. We have used psy-
chologist David Marks’s Vividness of 
Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) 
in our own work (see figure on page 113). 
This questionnaire asks for vividness 
judgments about images of 16 scenes 
that are rated from “no image at all, you 
only ‘know’ that you are thinking of the 
object,” scoring 1/5, to “perfectly clear 
and as vivid as real seeing,” scoring 
full marks. Galton’s intriguing observa-
tion that for some the “power of visual-
ization was zero” was almost entirely 
neglected over the following century, 
despite a great flowering of research on 
imagery more generally. A single Amer-
ican psychologist, Bill Faw, researched 
the topic in the past few decades, esti-
mating that around 2 to 3 percent of his 
undergraduate students, like Faw him-
self, were “wakeful non-imagers.” Oc-
casionally neurologists, starting in 1883 
with Jean Martin Charcot, the father of 
French neurology, encountered patients 
who lost the ability to visualize follow-
ing brain injuries or strokes, and a few 
psychiatrists, such as Jules Cotard in 
1882, recognized that mood disorders 
could cause a dimming of imagery and 
sometimes its disappearance. But most 
research examining imagery vividness 
focused on people with mid-range viv-
idness scores. It suggested that these 
scores were reasonably consistent over 
time, but they showed rather modest, 




































Imagery studies show that imagination can cause physical responses, demonstrating that visu-
alization is connected to vision. In this case, data show that people’s pupil dilation will change 
as they visualize brighter or darker imagery.
Combined results from hundreds of individuals show the brain areas consistently activated 
while visualizing. Those in the frontal and parietal lobes are linked to cognitive control, at-
tention, eye movements, language processing, and memory, whereas areas in the occipital 
and temporal lobes are visual. The mesh at lower left allows standardized mapping of brain 
regions. The arrow at top left indicates the insula, an area involved in sensation that normally 
would be obscured by other brain regions.
Adapted from C. Winlove et al., 2018.
Adapted from B. Laeng et al., 2014.
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The first time I knowingly encoun-
tered a person without the ability to 
create imagery was in 2003. Identi-
fied only by the code MX for research 
purposes, he was a delightful retired 
surveyor in his mid-60s. Not long be-
fore I met him, he had undergone a 
cardiac procedure. Shortly afterward 
he realized that he could no longer vi-
sualize: He had previously relished his 
active mind’s eye, for example, call-
ing to mind images of friends, family, 
and places he had visited as he settled 
down to sleep. His dreams became 
avisual after the procedure, and he 
found that when he read, the novel 
would no longer create a visual world. 
His vision, by contrast, appeared en-
tirely unaffected. 
MX’s account of his unusual symp-
toms was so compelling that we ulti-
mately studied his brain activation in 
a visualization task using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (see figure 
on page 114). When MX looked at fa-
mous faces, his pattern of brain activ-
ity was normal, but when he tried to 
visualize them, he failed to activate vi-
sual brain regions that came into play 
in our control participants. This dif-
ference suggested a satisfying neural 
correlate for the subtle but distinctive 
change in experience that he reported. 
I found MX’s case fascinating but 
did not anticipate what followed. The 
science journalist Carl Zimmer wrote 
an accessible account of our research 
in Discover magazine in 2010. Over the 
next few years, my colleagues Sergio 
Della Sala and Michaela Dewar and 
I were contacted by 21 people who 
recognized themselves in Zimmer’s 
description of MX—with the key dif-
ference that they had never been able 
to visualize. Their accounts were quite 
consistent. They usually became aware 
of this idiosyncrasy in their psycho-
logical makeup in early adulthood. It 
intrigued rather than dismayed them. 
Most respondents described rather 
poor autobiographical memory. Most 
still dreamed visually despite their 
lack of wakeful imagery. About half of 
them told us that they lacked imagery 
in all sense modalities, not just the vi-
sual. Some described affected relatives. 
Oddly, all but two were men. 
I felt that this phenomenon de-
served an appropriate name. The 
terms used in the neurological litera-
ture, such as defective revisualization 
and visual irreminiscence, were un-
wieldy. I consulted a colleague trained 
in classical philosophy, David Mitchell 
of the New College of Humanities in 
London, who suggested that we bor-
row from Aristotle, one of the Greek 
fathers of philosophy. Aristotle’s name 
for the mind’s eye, in his work De 
Anima (Of the Soul) was φαντασία, or 
phantasia. We prefixed an a, denoting 
absence, to coin the term aphantasia, 
the lack of a mind’s eye. Words are 
Aristotle’s name for the mind’s eye was 
phantasia, so we prefixed an a, denoting 
absence, to coin the term aphantasia.
5 4 3
2 1
The Vividness of Visual Imagery Question-
naire (VVIQ) asks responders to visualize a 
number of unfolding scenes, such as: The 
Sun rises above the horizon into a hazy sky, 
the sky clears and surrounds the Sun with 
blueness, clouds form and a storm blows 
up with flashes of lightning, then a rain-
bow appears. Responders are then asked to 
rate their imagery from 1 to 5, with 5 being 
perfectly clear and as vivid as real seeing, 4 
being clear and reasonably vivid, 3 being 
moderately clear and lively, 2 being vague 
and dim, and 1 being no image at all, just 
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powerful tools. To my surprise, this 
simple coinage, published in a letter 
describing our 21 aphantasic contacts, 
triggered an avalanche of interest.
Widespread press coverage of the 
word and the phenomenon that it de-
scribes has since led around 14,000 peo-
ple to get in touch by email. The ma-
jority have described various forms of 
aphantasia. Fewer people reported ex-
periences from the opposite end of the 
vividness spectrum, with exceptionally 
vivid imagery; we termed this hyper­
phantasia. We were struck by the strong 
emotion expressed in many of the mes-
sages: “This is unbelievable. I’ve gone 
my entire life attempting to explain that 
I cannot picture things in my head”; 
“. . . a phenomenon that feels like a se-
cret I’ve been keeping my whole life”; 
“so much of the world now makes 
sense”; “the craziest thing is knowing 
that I’m not alone.” The cofounder of 
Mozilla Firefox, Blake Ross, posted a 
feisty account of his self- discovery as 
aphantasic that went viral: “I felt that 
transcendent warmth I’ve only known 
once before, when a dorky high school 
outcast in Florida stumbled on a group 
of California programmers who just 
seemed to ‘get him.’ It’s the feeling of 
finding your people.” We had connect-
ed with an unmet need.
Our flooded email inbox created a 
unique opportunity for further re-
search. With the help of a team of stu-
dent interns from the University of Ex-
eter, I responded to the emails pouring 
in with a request to complete the VVIQ 
and another imagery questionnaire ex-
ploring a range of related topics. These 
questions asked, for instance, how and 
when people recognized their “differ-
ence,” whether they dream in images, 
and whether they have trouble recall-
ing episodes from their personal past. 
This exercise has allowed us to give a 
preliminary description of the psycho-
logical significance of imagery extremes 
from an analysis of 2,000 questionnaire 
pairs from people with lifelong aphan-
tasia and 200 with hyperphantasia. 
Vividness Extremes
Our first finding echoed Galton’s obser-
vations about his scientific colleagues. 
Although there are many exceptions to 
this rule, aphantasia is associated with a 
bias toward mathematical and scientific 
occupations, whereas hyperphantasia 
is associated with more traditionally 
creative trades. Next, we identified two 
areas of difficulty for many people with 
aphantasia: Approximately one-third 
report poor autobiographical memo-
ry, whereas a (partially overlapping) 
third report a problem in recognizing 
faces; these complaints are rare among 
people with hyperphantasia (see figure 
at the top of page 115). These findings 
from the far extremes of imagery viv-
idness harmonize with reports from 
other researchers that, in general, hav-
ing more vivid imagery predicts richer, 
clearer, and less effortful recollection 
of autobiographical events. Similarly, 
a previous study of people with con­
genital prosopagnosia—a lifelong failure 















y = – 62
z = 10
M.X.
L A patient who lost the ability to visualize after a surgery underwent functional magnetic 
resonance imagery of his brain activation during a visualization task. When he visual-
ized faces, he activated visual brain regions less than normal (above), but he activated 
more strongly brain areas that likely broadly indicate more mental effort (below).
Adapted from A. Zeman et al., 2010.
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their visual imagery tends to be faint. A 
fourth association kept cropping up in 
our correspondence, although we had 
not specifically asked about this trait in 
our questionnaire: Many people with 
aphantasia reported they were on the 
autistic spectrum. At the opposite end 
of the spectrum, hyper phantasia ap-
peared to be linked to  synesthesia—the 
process by which some quality of expe-
rience, such as the sound of a vowel, is 
accompanied by an involuntary, unre-
lated, secondary experience, such as a 
color (see “Synesthesia’s Altered Senses” 
in the July–August 2020 issue). 
These associations were both intrigu-
ing, raising questions about the under-
lying mechanisms involved, and reas-
suring: They suggested that rather than 
being isolated oddities, visual imagery 
extremes are part of a bigger psycho-
logical picture. Our hundredfold larger 
sample gave us an opportunity to ex-
amine two other hints from our previ-
ous study of 21 participants. Around 
60 percent of people with aphantasia 
reported visual dreams. This apparent 
discrepancy makes neurological sense, 
because the processes within the brain 
leading to dreaming and wakeful imag-
ery are very different, so it is quite plau-
sible that they should dissociate. People 
with aphantasia who dream avisually 
give fascinating descriptions of narra-
tive, conceptual, and emotional dreams. 
Much as in our smaller study, around 
half of those with extreme imagery, both 
high and low, told us that all their senses 
were affected; for the remainder, some 
or all the other modalities of imagery 
were of normal vividness. This disparity 
suggests that both factors common to all 
sense modalities and factors specific to 
each influence the vividness of imagery. 
Our estimates for the rates of ex-
treme imagery in the community are 
about 1 to 3 percent for aphantasia, and 
3 to 11 percent for hyperphantasia, de-
pending on the threshold chosen for di-
agnosis. Many of our participants with 
extreme imagery report that other fam-
ily members are similarly affected, al-
lowing us to calculate a roughly tenfold 
increase in risk compared with the gen-
eral population. It is too soon to judge 
whether this increase has a genetic ba-
sis. We hope to find out, but this effort 
will probably be hampered by a com-
plexity that may well have occurred 
to you. Aphantasia is almost certainly 
not a single entity: It is a variation in 
experience that can occur in a range 
of  settings—for example, in associa-
tion with face recognition  difficulty—or 
with lack of imagery in other senses. Its 
subtypes have yet to be clearly defined; 
but if they exist, their genetic back-
ground may well vary.
The Task of Triangulation
The story I have told you so far has re-
lied on first-person evidence: what our 
participants have told us about their 
imagery and other aspects of their men-
tal lives. This evidence is consistent: 
At around the time that we published 
our description of the psychological 
features of imagery extremes, anoth-
er research group, led by imagery re-
searcher Joel Pearson of the University 
of New South Wales in Sydney, Austra-
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About a third of people with aphantasia report poor autobiographical memory, whereas 
a partially overlapping third report problems recognizing faces; these complaints are rare 














Wilma Bainbridge at the University of Chicago and her colleagues took the approach of 
quantifying aphantasia with drawing. Their study found that aphantasics lack object 
memory, but do not lack spatial memory. When the participants were shown a photograph 
of a real scene for 10 seconds and then asked to draw it from memory, aphantasics recalled 
fewer objects in the scene, but had lower incidence of mistakenly adding objects not in the 
photograph. However, when aphantasics were then asked to pick out the image of the scene 
they had been shown from a set of scenes, they did as well as controls, or people with aver-
age imagery vividness. When the aphantasics were asked to copy that scene while looking 
at the image, there was also no difference from controls.
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you may be skeptical about first-person 
evidence altogether. People are not en-
tirely reliable witnesses of their mental 
lives. Descriptions of experience seem a 
good point of departure for psychologi-
cal research. But if imagery extremes 
are significant, it should be possible to 
triangulate these first-person reports 
with more objective measurements, ap-
plying both behavioral tests and neural, 
brain-based approaches. 
This work is underway. Pearson had 
previously used the idea that imag-
ery is like weak perception to devel-
op an ingenious measure of imagery 
strength. Briefly, his method uses the 
finding that a visual image formed in 
the mind’s eye can influence subse-
quent perception in much the same 
way as a faint visual stimulus pre-
sented externally. The extent of this 
influence can be measured to provide 
a relatively objective estimate of imag-
ery strength. In people with aphanta-
sia, the influence is undetectable, sug-
gesting that, indeed, they are failing to 
form visual images at all. 
A second elegant experiment from 
Pearson’s lab is also telling. His team 
asked people with and without aphan-
tasia to read a series of scary descrip-
tions, such as a swimmer’s view of an 
approaching shark, which would evoke 
vivid imagery in most of us. They found 
that people with aphantasia failed to 
show the marked change in skin con-
ductance observed in control partici-
pants without aphantasia (see figure at 
right). This difference was not because of 
an overall reduction in emotion, as the 
aphantasic participants showed a nor-
mal reaction to photos of scary scenes.
My team has recently used standard 
psychological tests to measure memory 
and imagination in people with aphan-
tasia, average imagery, and hyperphan-
tasia. Tests examining memory for ver-
bal and visual material over intervals 
of half an hour did not distinguish the 
groups. But there were marked differ-
ences when we compared the richness 
of the description of personally signifi-
cant past and imagined events. This re-
sult meshes well with the accounts given 
by some—though not all— people with 
aphantasia of relatively scant autobio-
graphical memory (see figure on page 117). 
Neural studies of aphantasia are also 
at an early stage. We have preliminary 
evidence that neural connectivity be-
tween frontal and posterior visual re-
gions of the brain is stronger in the rest-
ing brain in people with hyper phantasia 
than in people with aphantasia. Other 
candidate explanations include dif-
ferences in the area of visual cortices, 
which Pearson has shown to be related 
to differences in the strength and ac-
curacy of imagery using his weak- 
perception technique. There is also evi-
dence that variation in the excitability 
of visual regions can influence imagery 
strength. These possibilities are not mu-
tually exclusive, and more than one of 
these hypotheses may prove correct. 
Imagery Versus Imagination
Imagination—defined as our ability 
to represent, reshape, and reconceive 
things in their absence—is one of the 
defining powers of the human mind. 
Its central importance contributes to the 
interest in imagery extremes, as imagery 
is, for most of us, a prominent ingre-
dient of our imaginings. The fortunate 
opportunity to study large numbers of 
people with aphantasia and hyperphan-
tasia prompts some general reflections.
First, are aphantasia and hyper-
phantasia “disorders”? In general, I 
think not. They are intriguing varia-
tions in human experience, analogous 
to synesthesia, which, like aphantasia, 
affects around 2 percent of the popula-
tion. Both extremes of imagery viv-
idness have interesting psychological 
associations, but neither is a barrier to 
leading a rich, creative, and fulfilling 
life. I suspect that the two extremes of 
the vividness spectrum will prove to 
have balanced advantages and disad-
vantages. They are, however, occasion-
ally symptomatic of disorder: Aphan-
tasia, for example, can sometimes 
result from a stroke, a head injury, or 
an episode of depression. So if some-
one who has previously had imagery 
suddenly loses it, it’s reasonable to try 



























































When viewing a progression of scary images, people with or without aphantasia showed a 
physiological fear response, measured as a change in their skin conductance level (SCL) that 
indicates autonomous nervous system arousal (bottom). But when read a description of a scary 
scene, only people with aphantasia lacked a physiological fear response (top).
Adapted from M. Wicken et al., 2019.
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Second, does aphantasia imply an 
absence of imagination? The answer is 
a clear no. Among those people who 
contacted us because our description of 
aphantasia matched their own experi-
ence were the prolific neurologist Oliver 
Sacks, the pioneering geneticist Craig 
Venter, Pixar President Ed Catmull, and 
Mozilla Firefox cocreator Blake Ross. 
In an unexpected twist, over the past 
five years more than 100 aphantasic vi-
sual artists have been in touch with us, 
which has allowed my colleagues, artist 
Susan Aldworth and cultural historian 
Matthew MacKisack, to mount an exhi-
bition of aphantasic and hyperphantasic 
art. Imagination is a much richer and 
more complex capacity than visualiza-
tion. Aphantasia illustrates the wide va-
riety of representation available to hu-
man minds and brains; visual imagery 
is by no means the only one. 
Third, does aphantasia imply a ver-
bal cognitive style? This connection 
seemed likely to me when I first be-
gan to think about this topic. If you 
lack a mind’s eye, I mused, presum-
ably you will tend to be more interested 
in sounds and words than visual im-
ages. There may be some people with 
aphantasia for whom this description is 
true, but for several reasons I am now 
doubtful that this hypothesis about 
aphantasia is generally applicable. For 
one thing, many people with aphanta-
sia love the visual world, and some of 
them, aphantasic artists, devote their 
lives to depicting it. For another, about 
50 percent of people with extreme im-
agery report that all modalities of im-
agery, including imagery of sounds, 
are vivid in the case of hyperphantasia 
or dim to absent in the case of aphan-
tasia. This result suggests that a more 
relevant distinction than verbal versus 
visual may be abstract versus experien-
tial: For some of us, thought is closer to 
sensory experience, and for others, it’s 
more remote. But it’s possible that no 
single distinction is sufficient to capture 
the contrast between aphantasia and 
hyperphantasia, not least because it is 
unlikely that either is a single entity. 
Finally, what is imagery for? Aristotle 
wrote, “The soul never thinks without 
a phantasm.” He was wrong; aphanta-
sia contradicts this view. That is not to 
say that imagery does not play a part in 
the thinking of those of us who have it. 
But conscious imagery, at least, does not 
seem to be essential. It seems that people 
with aphantasia, especially those lacking 
all forms of sensory imagery, must either 
use more abstract  representations—such 
as those of language—in their thinking 
or unconsciously draw on imagery. We 
need more research to tease apart these 
alternatives. 
It has been a privilege to share so 
many insights from our participants’ in-
ner lives. I keep a few favorites pinned 
to my board. “I’m in the dark here,” 
wrote one contributor, quoting a famous 
line from Scent of a Woman; another 
mused, “There are lots of ways of being 
human,” surely one of the key messages 
from this work; a third wrote poignantly, 
“I’m learning to love without images.”
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Violin plots, named for their shape, show both the range and frequency of data (thick horizontal 
lines show median scores). For a task in which people are asked to describe imaginary scenes, 
either in an imagined future (for example, next New Year’s Eve) or without any specific tempo-
ral location, the plots show the richness of the narratives produced by people with aphantasia, 
hyperphantasia, and average imagery vividness (left). Differences also arise when the same 
groups are asked to recollect recent or remote episodes from their personal past (right).
For some of us, thought is closer to 
sensory experience, and for others,  
it’s more remote.
Adapted from F. Milton et al., 2020. https://psyarxiv.com/j2zpn
